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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1510 
 ___________ 
 
SUI JING ZHANG; 
CHIT FAI WONG, 
                                            Petitioners 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency Nos. A098 975 854 and A094 813 828) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 15, 2012 
 Before:  RENDELL, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed:  August 24, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sui Jing Zhang and Chit Fai Wong, wife and husband, are both natives and 
citizens of China.  The couple petitions for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) that dismissed their appeal from an 
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Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) final removal order, and that denied their motion for a 
remand.  We will deny the petition for review. 
 Zhang, the lead petitioner, sought asylum and related relief from removal based on 
her allegation that she would be persecuted in China because she had violated the 
country’s population policy by having two children in the United States.1
 The IJ held that Zhang was required by Board precedent to produce evidence of 
the local enforcement of the birth control policy; 
  Zhang feared 
that she would be forcibly sterilized if she were to be removed to China.  In support of 
her claim, Zhang provided, among other things, a document from the village committee 
of her home village (Guacai Village), stating that if she were to return to her hometown, 
she would be required to “positively undergo sterilization” under the local law, and be 
required to pay a “certain amount of social raising fee for her children’s household 
registration.”  A.R. 749.  Zhang also testified that if she and her family would return to 
China, they would reside in her husband’s village, Yang Fu San, which is “very close” to 
Guacai Village.  A.R. 374. 
i.e.
                                                 
1 Wong would be a derivative beneficiary if his wife were granted asylum. 
, evidence regarding how the policy 
is enforced in her husband’s village, where they would be residing.  The IJ determined 
that a continuance to allow Zhang to obtain such evidence was not necessary, as the case 
had been pending for many years, and there was no evidence that Zhang had somehow 
been precluded from obtaining that evidence previously.  Because Zhang had not met her 
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burden of producing corroborating evidence, the IJ denied relief. 
 In their brief to the BIA, the couple argued that the IJ erred in requiring 
corroboration from Wong’s village regarding enforcement policies.  They argued that the 
record established that policy is set on the provincial level, and that, in the alternative, 
Zhang’s village would still have the authority to sterilize Zhang, even if she were living 
in Wong’s village.2
 The BIA noted that the main issue on appeal was whether the IJ complied with the 
corroboration requirements we set forth in 
  They also argued that requiring a letter from Wong’s village was 
unreasonable, as it was too limited in geographic scope, and, even if it were reasonable, 
the IJ erred in failing to grant a continuance so that Zhang could obtain such a document.  
A.R. 119-27.  Zhang also submitted an “updated” asylum application and statement, with 
numerous articles, pictures, and a letter describing her recent conversion to Christianity 
and baptism.  A.R. 7-95.  The statement says that Zhang “was baptism [sic] on October 
24, 2011,” that she will “go to underground churches” if she returns to China, and that “I 
will be arrested or persecuted for my activity of attending an underground church.”  A.R. 
77. 
Abdulai v. Ashcroft
                                                 
2 Petitioners do not pursue the latter claim in their brief in this Court; thus, we will not discuss it 
further. 
, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d 
Cir. 2001), and other cases, namely:  “(1) an identification of the facts for which it is 
reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an inquiry as to whether the applicant has 
provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and, if he or she has not, (3) an 
4 
 
analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained his or her failure to do so.”  
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).  The BIA determined that the IJ properly 
followed these requirements, and further agreed with the IJ that Zhang had not shown 
good cause for a continuance.  The BIA held that the IJ had thus properly denied 
asylum.3
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  To establish eligibility for asylum, 
Zhang needed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  
  The BIA construed Zhang’s submission of new evidence as a motion for 
remand, and denied the motion.  The Board noted that Zhang had “not established, much 
less alleged that the Chinese government is or would become aware of her Christian 
practice in the United States,” and noted that “the proffered evidence relate [sic] to 
various populations in China and is distinguishable from [Zhang’s] circumstances, as an 
individual who converted to Christianity in the United States.”  A.R. 5.  The BIA 
determined that Zhang had failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum relief 
based on her Christianity.  The couple filed a timely petition for review. 
See Wang v. Gonzales
                                                 
3  The BIA stated that Zhang did not “meaningfully challenge the [IJ’s] denial of her application 
for asylum, based on leaving the country without permission, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (‘CAT’).”  A.R. 3.  The BIA considered those 
issues waived.  Zhang has not contested that conclusion.  We thus will not consider those forms 
of relief. 
, 405 F.3d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(person who has well-founded fear that she will be subjected to involuntary sterilization 
is deemed to have well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion).  
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“Whether an asylum applicant has demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear 
of future persecution is a factual determination reviewed under the substantial evidence 
standard.”  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005).  We may not reverse the 
BIA’s decision unless the record evidence would compel a reasonable fact-finder to 
conclude that Zhang had met her burden.  I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 
(1992).  An IJ can require corroboration of a claim, even from a credible applicant.  
Shardar v. Ashcroft
 We agree with the IJ and the BIA that it was reasonable to expect Zhang to 
produce corroboration of her claim that she would be sterilized if she were to return to 
her husband’s village.  Indeed, Zhang seems to concede as much, but she argues that 
evidence that she would be sterilized if she returned to her home village is sufficient to 
show that she would likewise be sterilized if she returned to her husband’s village.  We 
agree with Zhang that there is some evidence in the record that population control policy 
is set at the provincial level.  The record contains the population regulations for Zhejiang 
Province, the province that contains both of the villages in question.  A.R. 763-72.  The 
regulations provide that “oversea [sic] Chinese [who] have moved back to live in China,” 
in certain circumstances not applicable to Zhang and Wong, can apply to have one more 
child.  A.R. 765.  But the regulations do not state that a couple returning from overseas 
with two children must be sterilized and fined.  The regulations also state that “[t]he 
village office and street offices are responsible for carrying out the daily work of 
planning birth.”  A.R. 763.  One could infer that Zhang’s village has more stringent 
, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). 
6 
 
enforcement policies than the province requires.  Thus, the record evidence does not 
compel us to conclude that Zhang has met her burden of showing that she has a well-
founded fear of persecution in her husband’s village. 
 We further agree that the IJ did not abuse her discretion in failing to grant a 
continuance.  Zhang was on notice that it was her burden to show that she had a well-
founded fear of future persecution if she were to return to China.  Presumably, she also 
knew that she would be returning to her husband’s village rather than her own village.  
She did not (and has not) alleged that she would be unable to obtain information from her 
husband’s village regarding its enforcement of the population policy.  See
 Finally, we agree with the Board that Zhang failed to establish a prima facie case 
that she would be eligible for asylum based on her conversion to Christianity.
 BIA decision, 
A.R. 4-5 (“We note that nearly 2 years has elapsed since the [IJ] rendered her decision on 
February 19, 2010, and [Zhang] has not presented any evidence regarding the [coercive 
population control] policies in the husband’s village; nor has she offered any explanation 
as to why she has not obtained or been unable to obtain [sic] the policies.”). 
4
                                                 
4 “The BIA treats a motion to remand for the purpose of submitting additional evidence in the 
same manner as motions to reopen the record.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4)).  “[W]hen the Board or an Immigration Judge denies 
reopening [or remand] on prima facie case grounds, the ultimate decision should be reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion, while findings of fact should be reviewed for substantial evidence.”  
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Board abuses its discretion only 
where the ultimate decision denying reopening was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See 
Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  Zhang did 
not assert that the Chinese government is aware, or would become aware of her 
Christianity.  Although she stated that she would attend an “underground church,” it is 
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not clear which church she would attend in China.  While Zhang submitted evidence 
reporting problems experienced by Christians in China, she did not explain how the 
evidence she submitted related to her or to how she would practice her religion in China.  
Accordingly, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying her implicit motion for 
remand. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
